German Arms Exports to Israel

As of 29 March 2024, 32,623 Palestinian people have been killed since the start of Israel’s major military assault on Gaza in October 2023. Approximately 70% of those killed have been women and children, while many more are missing. Israel’s relentless, indiscriminate bombardment and siege of Gaza has created an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe, with 2.2 million people on the verge of man-made famine. The Israeli military has embarked on unparalleled and catastrophic levels of infrastructural destruction and agricultural damage, and the systematic targeting of life-sustaining civilian structures, including hospitals and health care facilities, food-providing facilities, schools, universities, religious and cultural heritage sites, and homes.

As early as November 2023, a group of UN experts warned that Israel’s actions by that time pointed to a “genocide in the making”, while on 11 and 12 January 2024 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held public hearings on the request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by South Africa in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel). In late January, the ICJ ruled that there is a “plausible” risk of genocide of the Palestinian people in Gaza. This ruling, alongside with a global mobilisation movement, have since started to have a slow but visible effect on the international arms transfers to Israel. In the past two months, several states, including Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and Canada have taken steps to suspend export licences and halt military exports to Israel, either for specific weapons or for all.

In late February 2024, UN experts under the remit of OHCHR stated unequivocally that “any transfer of weapons or ammunition to Israel that would be used in Gaza is likely to violate international humanitarian law (IHL) and must cease immediately”, adding that “states must accordingly refrain from transferring any weapon or ammunition – or parts for them – if it is expected, given the facts or past patterns of behaviour, that they would be used to violate international law.”

While Israel holds a significant arms manufacturing industry, it also relies on international imports of weapons, weapon systems, or parts thereof, to carry out its genocidal military campaign. Germany is one of the world’s largest arms exporters, often listed amongst the top ten arms suppliers worldwide. For several years, Israel figures amongst the top recipient countries of German arms exports, while the two states have a long history of military cooperation.

Forensis collaborated with Berlin-based lawyers in order to support an urgent application to the German government on behalf of Palestinians in Gaza to halt all exports of war weapons to Israel, filed on 5 April 2024. For this purpose, Forensis studied publicly available information on past, current, and potential future export licences and deliveries of weapons and military equipment from Germany to Israel. This information has been compiled from a number of monitoring groups and open access governmental data. Sources for information on international arms transfer are scarce, data is always partial and incomplete. This report, undertaken in collaboration with Palestine Speaks Berlin, Fight for Falastin, and other independent researchers, attempts to bring together this information on arms exports from Germany to Israel in a comprehensive manner, aiming to contribute to international calls to stop all arms exports to Israel.

Germany is the second largest exporter of major conventional arms to Israel after the US (SIPRI)

• According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2023 Germany was the second largest supplier of “major conventional arms” to Israel, responsible for 47% of Israel’s total imports, following the US at 53%.¹ This percentage includes the delivery of two Sa’ar 6-class missile corvettes,² as well as missiles and engines for tanks and other armoured vehicles. This figure does not appear to be an outlier: since 2003, Germany has been consistently ranking second – and sometimes first – at the share of total imports of major conventional weapons by Israel. Over the period between 2019-2023, Germany’s share of major conventional arms imported by Israel was 30%, second after the US at 69%.

• According to SIPRI, between 2003 and 2023, major conventional arms with a value of more than 2 billion TIVs (SIPRI’s Trend-Indicator Values) were “actually” exported from Germany to Israel.³ Since 2013, Israel has featured 9 times in the top ten recipient countries of major conventional arms deliveries from Germany in SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database.

A bar chart that lists the top suppliers of “major conventional weapons” to Israel, and each supplier’s respective share of the importer’s total, for the period 2003-2023, as reported by SIPRI. Additionally, percentages for 5-year periods are given. Data source: Arms Transfers Database, SIPRI (Forensis, 2024)

• Since 2003, Germany has authorised 4,427 individual arms export licences to Israel, with a combined value of approximately 3.3 billion Euro, as reported in the annual Military Equipment Export Reports by the German government.⁴ For comparison, over the same period – and despite the ongoing Israeli occupation, as well as major military assaults on Gaza over the years in question – only 54 export licences were rejected, with a value of 8.1 million Euro – marking an approval rate of 99.75%.⁵

• Since 2013, Israel has featured at least 8 times in the list of the “top twenty most important countries of destination” for which individual export licences for military equipment were granted by Germany.⁶ Out of the 3.3 billion Euro combined value of the licences between 2003 and 2023, 53% regard export permits for the Germany-designated subsector of war weapons and the rest for that of other military equipment.⁷

• Between 2003 and 2018 – data is redacted thereafter – war weapons worth more than 1.1 billion Euro were exported from Germany to Israel.

• In the past five years alone, between 2019 and 2023, Germany granted export licences to Israel for over 1.1 billion Euro worth of arms – almost half of which regards export licences of war weapons. Figures for actual war weapons exports over the same period have been redacted by the German government in the corresponding official reports.

Sharp increase in arms export licences from Germany to Israel after October 2023

• In 2023, 308 individual licences for exports of military equipment to Israel were authorised, with a total value of approximately 326.5 million Euro, according to the German government.⁸ This marks a tenfold increase from 2022, where the total value of approved licences amounted to 32.3 million Euro.⁹ The largest volume of these licences in terms of value – 88% – was authorised in the second half of 2023.¹⁰ According to Tagesschau, 185 individual export permits were approved in the twenty-six days between 7 October and 2 November alone.¹¹

• The value of approved arms export licences to Israel in 2023 constitutes the fourth largest in the last two decades. If licences for large naval warships – submarines and corvettes – were to be excluded, 2023 represents in fact the largest – in terms of value – volume of arms export licences from Germany to Israel of the last twenty years. Additionally, 2023 marks the year with the second largest number of approved export licences over the same period.

Total number of approved arms export licences from Germany to Israel between 2003–2023. In green, the number of approved licences for 2023 is highlighted. In diagonal fill, the year with the largest number of licences over the period in question is marked. Sources: Military Equipment Export Reports by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, 2003-2022; Frage Nr. 12/531, BMWK. (Forensis, 2024)

• According to the Financial Times, in November 2023, the German government “created a working group of the foreign office, ministry of economic affairs and office for export control tasked with expediting Israeli arms requests”.¹²

• As of February 2024, despite the ICJ’s ruling on provisional measures that demanded Israel to take actions to prevent the genocide of the Palestinian people, and despite the evident worsening of the humanitarian situation in Gaza due to Israel’s relentless military assault, the German government has continued to authorise export licences for military equipment and war weapons to Israel. From 1 January up to 21 February 2024, Germany approved individual export licences with a combined value of slightly more than 9 million Euro – 32,449 Euro of which regard licences for war weapons.¹³

Anti-tank weapons, ammunition, warships, tank engines, missiles – amongst others

• The individual export licences that were authorised in 2023 – the majority of which in the second half of the year — include a large number of permits for the export of wheeled and tracked military vehicles (65 licences), military technology (57 licences), and military electronics (29 licences). The Military List (ML)¹⁴ positions of bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles, other explosive devices and charges (17 licences) and, to a smaller extent, of ammunition, explosive and fuels, as well as large calibre weapons and small firearms were also included in the export authorisations.

Breakdown of arms export licences from Germany to Israel in 2023, incl. other military equipment and war weapons, with the distribution of the number of licences in the different ML positions. The corresponding values for each ML position have not been disclosed by the German government at the time of writing. Source: Frage Nr. 12/531, BMWK. (Forensis, 2024)

• The Germany-designated subsector of war weapons amounted to 20.1 million Euro.¹⁵ This included, amongst others, licences for 3,000 portable anti-tank weapons, 500,000 rounds of ammunition for machine, submachine guns or fully/semi automatic rifles, as well as ignition and propelling charges for ammunition and other types of weapons.

• The portable anti-tank weapons authorised for export are likely to be the RGW 90, known as “Matador”, a portable shoulder-fired rocket launcher jointly developed by Germany, Israel, and Singapore and manufactured in Germany by Dynamit Nobel Defence, based in Burbach. The Matador has been used by the Israeli army since 2009.¹⁶ During Israel’s ongoing military assault, Matador’s use by Israeli soldiers has been documented on multiple occasions, including against Palestinian homes in Khan Younis, southern Gaza.¹⁷

• According to SIPRI’s arms transfer database, in 2023 exports of the following major conventional weapons could be documented: 2 Sa’ar 6-class corvettes (warships); 10 diesel engines MTU 750hp (or possibly 6V-890) for Eitan APC (Armoured Personnel Carriers) and IFV (Infantry Fighting Vehicles); 50 diesel engines MT883Ka for Merkava-4 tanks and Namer APC (Armoured Personnel Carriers); 10 DM2A4 Seehecht (SeaHake mod 4) torpedoes (underwater missiles) for Israel’s (German-manufactured) Dolphin submarines.¹⁸
  • The Sa’ar 6 corvettes – approximately one third of whose cost was subsidised by the German government¹⁹ – have been operational for the first time during Israel’s ongoing military assault on Gaza, actively involved in strikes offshore.²⁰ Additionally, the corvettes reinforce the Israeli Navy’s arsenal, as the latter is imposing a total naval blockade of Gaza, amidst a severe humanitarian aid crisis.
  • The Eitan APC – for which diesel engines were exported to Israel, according to SIPRI – is the newest armoured personnel vehicle in the Israeli army and has reportedly become operational in Israel’s military assault on Gaza, ahead of schedule,²¹ while its fighting vehicle counterpart has also been employed “on the front lines of Israeli forces, along with tank units and infantry conducting assault operations in the urban areas of the Gaza Strip.”²²
  • The Merkava-4 tank – for which diesel engines were exported to Israel, according to SIPRI – has long been considered “integral” to Israel’s military operations,²³ while in the context of the ongoing ground invasion of Gaza, it has been characterised as “Israel’s main asset”.²⁴ Since October 2023, there has been extensive documentation of the use of tanks in indiscriminate attacks against civilians and life-sustaining infrastructure.²⁵ There is also documentation of the Namer APC being deployed in Gaza since October 2023.²⁶ Additionally, tanks, alongside tractors and other military vehicles, have been used to systematically uproot farms and agricultural land in Gaza in a deliberate act of ecocide, which is a critical dimension of Israel’s ongoing genocidal campaign.²⁷ Since 2002, Germany has exported an estimated number of 1,060 diesel engines for the Merkava tanks and Namer APCs to Israel, according to SIPRI’s database.²⁸

• In January 2024, Der Spiegel reported that the German government had agreed to fulfil a request by Israel, made in November 2023, for the supply of 10,000 rounds of 120mm tank ammunition.²⁹ In order to ensure a speedier delivery, the ammunition would be supplied from the existing Germany military stockpiles, which would then be replenished by the German arms manufacturing industry, according to Der Spiegel.³⁰ The indiscriminate use of tank ammunition against Palestinians and critical civilian infrastructure, including medical facilities, aid convoys, and civilian shelters in Gaza since October 2023 has been widely documented.³¹

• Additionally, in October 2023, Germany authorised Israel to use two of the five Heron TP combat drones that they had leased from the Israeli arms manufacturer Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI).³² According to its CEO, the Heron TP drone has “demonstrated its strategic importance” in the ongoing military offensive in Gaza.³³ It has been widely documented that in past Israeli offensives in Gaza, the Israeli army has used drones not only in surveillance and target acquisition, but also for attacking civilians with missiles.³⁴ The use of drones for targeting and killing Palestinian people, including journalists as well as medical staff, has also been documented in the context of Israel’s ongoing military assault on Gaza.³⁵

• Arms approved for export between 2003-2023 include almost all ML positions. A significant share in the total value of almost 3.3 billion worth of arms approved over the period in question corresponds to ML 9 (naval vessels of war) and covers the export of the six warships (two Dolphin submarines, 4 Sa’ar missile corvettes). The second largest volume – in terms of value – of approved arms export licences between 2003-2022 is attributed to ML 6 position (ground vehicles, namely tanks, other armoured vehicles and components thereof). Additional positions of interest approved for export over the past twenty years include ML 4 (bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles, other explosive devices and charges), ML 3 (ammunition and fuse setting devices), ML 1 (small firearms). Data analysis shows that in the majority of those weapon categories, the approved exports increased significantly in the years after Israel’s major military assaults on Gaza.

Even though efforts have been made in the past decades to create a more transparent policy on documenting international arms imports and exports, official data published by states is still limited in scope, rendering it difficult to form a comprehensive picture. While it is easier to access information on the authorisation of exports – i.e. arms export licences – official information on “actual” exports is much scarcer and more inaccessible. Actual exports occur when the (already approved for export) military article has been delivered or is on route to the recipient state. Export licences do not always correspond to data on actual arms exports in any given year for different reasons; the actual export may take place in different calendar years, or, sometimes, not take place at all. Information on export licences is as important nonetheless because – apart from the fact that a significant part of the arms approved for export is eventually being delivered – such information also shows “the willingness of governments of exporting states”³⁶ to equip repressive regimes.

Over the course of this research, a variety of sources were consulted in order to examine past, current, and potential future arms export licences and deliveries from Germany to Israel. These include:

1. Military Equipment Export Reports by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, 2003-2022
2. Annual Reports by the Council of the European Union on Exports of Military Technology and Equipment, 2003-2022
3. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
4. United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade)
5. Other sources, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA); the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Annual Reports; parliamentary questions to the federal government; media articles; social media posts; as well as other websites and databases that have been gathered by collectives and individuals engaged in disarmament efforts.

Read more about the above-mentioned sources as well as a summary of key information regarding their scope and methodology in our full report.

^{1. Read more about SIPRI’s sources, methodology, as well as the major conventional weapons that the Arms Transfer Database tracks here.↩}

^{2. The warships were delivered to Israel in 2020 and 2021, but they were booked under 2022 and 2023 in SIPRI’s Arms Transfer Database.↩}

^{3. Read more about the unit measuring system of SIPRI here.↩}

^{4. With the exception of the figures for 2023, which derive from the governmental response dated 09.01.2024 to question Nr. 12/531 posed by a member of the German parliament. ↩}

^{5. This approval rate is calculated by comparing the value of the denied licences to that of the total value of the licences requested.↩}

^{6. At least 8 times, because the Military Equipment Export Report for 2023 has not yet been published at the time of writing; however, the large volume of arms exports authorisations to Israel this year suggests that Israel would feature in the list of top recipient countries of military equipment from Germany for the year 2023 too.↩}

^{7. For more information about the distinction between war weapons and other military equipment in the German export licence authorisation process, see chapter 3 of the full report.↩}

^{8. The number of export licences listed here is the sum of individual permits as attributed to each ML (Military List) position. It may be slightly higher than the total number of licences, as one permit can contain several articles that are covered by different ML positions, but this figure is not yet available, as the Military Equipment Export Report for 2023 has not been published at the time of writing. For more information on the ML positions, see chapter 3 of the full report. ↩}

^{9. Bundesregierung, ‘Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Exportpolitik für Konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im Jahre 2022’, 22 December 2023.↩}

^{10. Bundesregierung, ‘Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Exportpolitik für Konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im Ersten Halbjahr 2023’, 6 February 2024.↩}

^{11. Tagesschau, ‘Deutsche Rüstungsexporte nach Israel fast verzehnfacht’, 8 November 2023.↩}

^{12. Roula Khalaf, ‘German Arms Exports to Israel Surge as Berlin Backs Campaign against Hamas’ The Financial Times, 9 November 2023.↩}

^{13. Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz, ‘Fragestunde des Deutschen Bundestages am 21. Februar 2024, Frage Nr. 052’, 21 February 2024.↩}

^{14. For more information on the Military List positions, see chapter 3 of the full report. ↩}

^{15. This figure is included in the total value of export licences in 2023 amounting to 326.5 million Euro. ↩}

^{16. Breaking the Silence, ‘Soldiers’ Testimonies from Operation Cast Lead, Gaza 2009’, June 2009.↩}

^{17. Middle East Monitor, ‘Khan Younis’ homes targeted by Israeli MATADOR fun missiles’, 12 February 2024; Nico Tielke, ‘Würgendorf: Rüstungsfirma Dynamit Nobel Defense liefert Panzerfäuste nach Israel’ Siegener Zeitung, 31 October 2023. Forensis has seen additional evidence of the Matador being used by the Israeli army in Gaza since October 2023.↩}

^{18. Except for the corvettes, the number of the rest of the arms delivered is an estimation, according to SIPRI.↩}

^{19. The German government co-financed the corvettes with an amount of 115 million Euro. Bundesregierung, ‘Antwort der Bundesregierung, Drucksache 18/5040’, 26 May 2015. See also: SIPRI’s Arms Transfer Database.↩}

^{20. Richard Thomas, ‘Israeli Navy’s Sa’ar 6 Corvettes Used to Strike Gaza Ground Targets’ Naval Technology, 16 October 2023.↩}

^{21. Rebecca Rommen, ‘Israel’s New Eitan APC Spotted in Combat against Hamas in Gaza. The IDF Prematurely Rushed the High-Tech Armor into Service.’ Business Insider, 12 November 2023.↩}

^{22. Militarnyi, ‘Israel Uses Latest Eitan AFVs in War against Hamas’, 6 November 2023.↩}

^{23. Army Recognition, ‘Merkava Tanks Provide Crucial Firepower for Israeli Army in Gaza Urban Warfare’, 13 November 2023.↩}

^{24. Diego Stacey and Rodrigo Silva, ‘The Merkava IV Tank, Israel’s Main Asset for the Ground Offensive in Gaza’, EL PAÍS English, 24 October 2023.↩}

^{25. See chapter 4 of the full report for indicative documentation references for such attacks.↩}

^{26. For example, see: Army Recognition, ‘Israel Defense Forces Deploy Heavily Armored Namer APCs at Gaza Border’, 16 October 2023.↩}

^{27. Forensic Architecture, ‘“No Traces of Life”: Israel’s Ecocide in Gaza 2023-2024’, 29 March 2024; Kaamil Ahmed, Damien Gayle, and Aseel Mousa, ‘‘Ecocide in Gaza’: does scale of environmental destruction amount to a war crime?’ The Guardian, 29 March 2024. ↩}

^{28. SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database.↩}

^{29. Matthias Gebauer, Christoph Schult, and Gerald Traufetter, ‘Waffenhilfe für den Gaza-Krieg: Bundesregierung prüft Lieferung von Panzermunition an Israel’ Der Spiegel, 16 January 2024.↩}

^{30. Ibid.↩}

^{31. See chapter 4 of the full report for indicative documentation references for such attacks.↩}

^{32. Matthias Gebauer and Marina Kormbaki, ‘Waffenhilfe: Deutschland stellt Israel Heron-Kampfdrohnen zur Verfügung’, Der Spiegel, 11 October 2023.↩}

^{33. The Jerusalem Post, ‘Introducing the IAI Heron Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAS)’, 22 November 2023.↩}

^{34. Human Rights Watch, ‘Precisely Wrong: Gaza Civilians Killed by Israeli Drone-Launched Missiles’, July 2009.↩}

^{35. See chapter 4 of the full report for indicative documentation references for such attacks.↩}

^{36. Amnesty International, ‘Israel / OPT: Fuelling Conflict: Foreign Arms Supplies to Israel/Gaza’, February 2009.↩}